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OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
 Wardell Leroy Giles appeals the District Court’s denial 
of his motion to substitute Gary Campbell’s estate as a 
defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a).  
For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
. 
 
I. 
 
Giles was a prisoner serving time in the Delaware 
penal system at all times pertinent to this appeal.  Campbell 
was a sergeant at the Sussex Correctional Institution in 
Georgetown, Delaware.  Giles brought excessive force and 
deliberate indifference claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
officers including Campbell based on a confrontation that 
occurred during Giles’s transfer to the Sussex Correctional 
Institution on November 27, 2001, and against other 
defendants regarding his medical treatment after the incident.  
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2009).  The 
specific allegations of the confrontation and Giles’s 
subsequent medical treatment are detailed in our prior opinion 
and are not necessary to our resolution of the issues currently 
on appeal.  Id.
 
 at 323-24.  
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On June 28, 2004, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of several defendants, including Campbell, 
on the basis that they were entitled to qualified immunity.  
The District Court held a bench trial on Giles’s claims against 
the remaining defendants and entered judgment in favor of 
those defendants.  
 
 Giles appealed and this Court reversed the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for trial.  
Id. at 327-29.  On remand, on October 22, 2009, the Delaware 
Department of Justice (“the Government”), which had 
represented Campbell and continued to represent the other 
defendants whose case was revived on remand, filed a 
suggestion of death, informing the District Court that 
Campbell had died in July 2006.  On December 14, 2009, 
Giles moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) 
to substitute Wendy Selby, the administratrix of Campbell’s 
estate, as a defendant.  Neither the suggestion of death nor the 
motion to substitute was served on the estate.  The District 
Court denied the motion to substitute, holding that Giles’s 
claim was not pending under Delaware law and was therefore 
extinguished, and ordered Campbell’s name removed from 
the caption.  Giles proceeded to trial against the remaining 
defendants and the jury found in favor of the defendants.  
Giles then filed this appeal.1
 
   
II. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  This Court has 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
 This Court reviews the District Court’s denial of 
Giles’s motion to substitute Campbell’s estate for abuse of 
discretion.  McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 836-37 
(3d Cir. 1994).  However, this Court exercises plenary review 
of the District Court’s interpretations of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and legal conclusions.  Singletary v. Penn. 
Dep’t of Corrs., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001); Barlow v. 
Ground
                                                                
1 We note with gratitude that Giles was represented in this 
matter by pro bono counsel. 
, 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1994). 
4 
 
 
III. 
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) provides the 
procedure required for substitution after the death of a party: 
 
(1) Substitution if the Claim Is Not 
Extinguished.  If a party dies and the claim is 
not extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper party.  A motion for 
substitution may be made by any party or by the 
decedent’s successor or representative.  If the 
motion is not made within 90 days after service 
of a statement noting the death, the action by or 
against the decedent must be dismissed.  
  
(2) Continuation Among the Remaining Parties.  
After a party’s death, if the right sought to be 
enforced survives only to or against the 
remaining parties, the action does not abate, but 
proceeds in favor of or against the remaining 
parties.  The death should be noted on the 
record.  
 
(3) Service.  A motion to substitute, together 
with a notice of hearing, must be served on the 
parties as provided in Rule 5 and on nonparties 
as provided in Rule 4.  A statement noting death 
must be served in the same manner.  Service 
may be made in any judicial district.  
 
We address first the issue of whether Giles’s claim 
against Campbell was extinguished pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1) 
after Campbell’s death.  Second, we address whether the 
District Court had personal jurisdiction over Campbell’s 
estate when it was not served by either party pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, as was required by Rule 
25(a)(3).   
 
A. 
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When a party to a lawsuit dies, the threshold 
consideration pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1) is whether the claim 
is extinguished.   
 
The substantive law applied to determine whether a 
claim is extinguished is not supplied by Rule 25, because, as 
the Supreme Court has noted, Rule 25 “‘does not resolve the 
question [of] what law of survival of actions should be 
applied . . . . [It] simply describes the manner in which parties 
are to be substituted in federal court once it is determined that 
the applicable substantive law allows the action to survive a 
party’s death.’”  Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 587 
n.3 (1978) (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting 
Robertson v. Wegmann, 545 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1977)).  
The Supreme Court in Robertson held that pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988, where federal law is “‘deficient,’” courts are 
“to turn to ‘the common law, as modified and changed by the 
constitution and statutes of the [forum] State,’ as long as these 
are ‘not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.’”  Id. at 588 (quoting § 1988).  The Court in 
Robertson noted that “‘the survival of civil rights of actions 
under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or 
defendant’” was an area not covered by federal law.  Id. at 
589 (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 
n.14 (1973)).  In Robertson, the Louisiana survival statute 
allowed claims to survive only in favor of a spouse, children, 
parents or siblings.  Id. at 587.  The Supreme Court held that 
“[d]espite the broad sweep of § 1983, we can find nothing in 
the statute or its underlying policies to indicate that a state 
law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably 
be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship.”  Id. at 
590-91.  The Supreme Court held that the “policies 
underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured 
by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of 
power by those acting under color of state law” and that the 
Louisiana survivorship laws were not inconsistent with those 
policies.  Id.
 
 at 591.   
 In this case, it is undisputed that the forum state is 
Delaware, so the District Court properly examined 
Delaware’s law of survivorship to determine whether Giles’s 
claim against Campbell was extinguished.  Under Delaware 
law, claims that arise before the death of the decedent are 
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barred against the estate unless they are presented to the 
estate within eight months of the death of the decedent.  Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 12, § 2102(a).  However, Delaware law also 
provides that “[n]o presentation of claim is required in regard 
to matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent which 
were pending at the time of the decedent’s death.”  Id. § 
2104(2) (emphasis added).  Like the Louisiana survival 
statute at issue in Robertson
 
, the Delaware survival scheme is 
“not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States,” and should apply in this case pursuant to § 1988.   
 Because Giles did not present his claim to the estate 
within eight months of Campbell’s death under § 2102(a), for 
his claim to survive, it must have been “pending” at the time 
of Campbell’s death under § 2104(2).  The District Court 
found that Giles’s claim was not pending at the time of 
Campbell’s death because it had granted summary judgment 
in Campbell’s favor and that decision had not yet been 
overturned by this Court.  
 
 The District Court relied on Swartz v. Meyers, 204 
F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2000), for the proposition that “[a]n action 
or suit is pending from either the filing of a complaint or 
service of summons until the rendition of a final judgment.”  
Appendix 5.  However, the District Court erroneously 
concluded that the grant of summary judgment in Campbell’s 
favor was a final judgment.  Swartz addressed the question of 
whether an appeal was “pending” to toll the statute of 
limitations for filing a federal habeas claim.  Importantly, 
Swartz held that “‘pending’ includes the time for seeking 
discretionary review, whether or not discretionary review is 
sought.”  Id.
 
 at 421.   
Applying Swartz
 
 to this case requires a finding that 
Giles’s suit was still pending against Campbell.  Giles could 
not appeal the summary judgment dismissing Campbell, as it 
was not a final order since there were remaining claims and 
defendants.  Giles appealed the District Court’s summary 
judgment order at the earliest possible moment he could.   
 To hold otherwise would require Giles to have filed an 
interlocutory appeal of the District Court’s summary 
judgment ruling in order to protect his claim against 
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Campbell from the possibility of Campbell’s death before the 
claims against the other parties were resolved.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review a “final 
decision,” which this Court has defined as “‘one which ends 
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute judgment.’”  Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root 
Servs., Inc., 618 F.3d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Catlin 
v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).  This Court has 
explained that the goal of the finality rule is to avoid 
piecemeal litigation.  Id. at 403.  The District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to Campbell was not a final 
order because it terminated fewer than all the claims and 
parties.  Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 
470, 476 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 
(“[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action 
as to any of the claims or parties
 
 and may be revised at any 
time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”) (emphasis 
added); Del. Super. Ct. R. 54(b) (same). 
 Since Giles’s claim against Campbell was pending 
under Delaware law at the time of Campbell’s death, no 
presentation of the claim was required, and the claim is not 
barred under Delaware law.2
                                                                
2 The Government also argues that Giles’s claim against the 
estate is time-barred by Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8113, which 
extends the time to file a claim against an estate by six 
months from the date of the decedent’s death if the time to 
file the action had not expired during the decedent’s lifetime.  
Section 8113 further provides that if a claim is filed within 
the proper time with the estate but is then rejected, the estate 
may not raise a statute of limitations defense so long as the 
plaintiff commences an action within three months of being 
notified of the estate’s rejection.  Section 8113 is inapplicable 
to this case and is aimed at claims that have not already been 
brought.  This section deals with claims that “the time within 
which the action could have been brought had not expired in 
the lifetime of the decedent” (emphasis added), and extends 
the statute of limitations for those claims.  Giles had already 
brought his claim against Campbell, and, as discussed above, 
  Thus, Giles’s claim against 
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Campbell was not extinguished by Campbell’s death and we 
will vacate the District Court’s decision to the contrary.   
 
B. 
 
We turn next to the question whether the District Court 
had personal jurisdiction over Campbell’s estate.    
 
Rule 25(a)(3) requires that both the motion to 
substitute and the suggestion of death be served pursuant to 
Rule 5 for parties and pursuant to Rule 4 for nonparties.  
Campbell’s executrix, representing his estate, is a nonparty to 
Giles’s lawsuit and, thus, must have been served pursuant to 
Rule 4.  See Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that, under Rule 25, the service required 
“on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives 
of the deceased party’s estate, must be service pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4”); Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 518-
19 (5th Cir. 1971); 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller 
& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
 
 § 1965 
(3d ed. 2007) (“[T]he procedures of Rule 4 must be followed 
in serving the motion on the representative or successor of a 
deceased party.”).  However, the Government failed to serve 
its suggestion of death on the estate pursuant to Rule 4 and 
Giles likewise failed to serve his motion to substitute on the 
estate pursuant to Rule 4.   
Giles argues that while he did not serve Campbell’s 
estate, his motion to substitute was nonetheless properly 
served because it was served upon “Campbell’s counsel.”  
Giles Letter Br. 1, Feb. 15, 2012.  Indeed, the Government, 
which represented Campbell before his death, opposed 
Giles’s motion to substitute Campbell’s estate in District 
Court and filed a brief in response to Giles’s opening brief in 
this appeal.   
 
Giles’s argument is foreclosed by our decision in Bass 
v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1989).  In Bass
                                                                                                                                               
that claim was pending at Campbell’s death, so no 
presentation to the estate was required pursuant to § 2104(2).   
, a defendant 
(Carr) died during the pendency of the litigation and the 
attorney who had represented Carr contended that he 
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continued to represent him.  Id. at 50 n.12.  The attorney in 
Bass filed a suggestion of death on behalf of Carr (and 
another deceased defendant), and argued that the case against 
Carr should be dismissed because the plaintiff did not timely 
move to substitute the defendant’s estate.  Id.  We rejected the 
attorney’s arguments at the outset, because “[c]ounsel’s 
attorney-client relationship with Carr ceased at Carr’s death.”  
Id.; see also Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 
(4th Cir. 1985) (“The attorney’s agency to act ceases with the 
death of his client . . . and he has no power to continue or 
terminate an action on his own initiative.”). 3
 
  We concluded 
our analysis by noting that the suggestion of death “was 
deficient because the suggestion was not served on the 
decedents’ successors or representatives as required by Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 25(a).”  868 F.2d at 50 n.12. 
Applying Bass, we hold that the Government’s 
representation of Campbell ended when he died.  We note 
that there is no evidence that the Government thereafter began 
representing Campbell’s estate.  Accordingly, the parties were 
required to — and failed to — serve Campbell’s estate 
pursuant to Rule 4.  We hold that the District Court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the estate.  See Ayres v. Jacobs & 
Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
personal jurisdiction is not conferred if service under Rule 4 
is not properly effected); Ransom
 
, 437 F.2d at 519 (same).   
Two cases from other Courts of Appeals support our 
conclusion.  In Ransom v. Brennan, the plaintiff filed a 
breach of contract case in district court pursuant to the court’s 
diversity jurisdiction against defendant Brennan, who died 
during the pretrial stages.  Id. at 515.  Brennan’s counsel 
Kline suggested his death on the record and, within ninety 
days, the plaintiff moved to substitute Brennan’s executrix.  
Id.  However, the plaintiff served the motion only on Kline 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5, not on the executrix 
under Rule 4.  Id.
                                                                
3  The Bass court removed counsel for the deceased defendant 
from the docket of the case as representing him, since the 
defendant had died.  868 F.2d at 50 n.12.  We will do the 
same and list the Government as representing only Cassase 
and Steele. 
  The district court granted the motion to 
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substitute, but several months later the executrix, through 
Kline, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Id. 
at 516.  The district court held it had jurisdiction over the 
executrix because Brennan had been validly served, so it was 
unnecessary to “reacquire” jurisdiction over the substituted 
party.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
examined Rules 4 and 5 and reversed, holding that while Rule 
5 is “clerical and administrative in nature” and applies to 
papers filed after the complaint, Rule 4 is “jurisdictionally 
rooted.”  Id. at 516-17.  Service under Rule 5, therefore, 
cannot be substituted for service under Rule 4.  Id. at 518.  
The Ransom court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
Kline’s subsequent appearance on behalf of the estate and the 
fact that the executrix had actual notice meant that the service 
requirements in Rule 25(a)(3) could be relaxed.  Id. at 519.4  
The court concluded that the district court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the executrix, id., and, thus, reversed the 
district court’s grant of the motion to substitute.  Id.
 
 at 522.   
Similarly, in Atkins v. City of Chicago
 
, 547 F.3d 869, 
874 (7th Cir. 2008), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that  
[t]he case law makes clear that with the 
inapplicable exception [of where the opposing 
party files the suggestion of death and does not 
know who the successor is], notice to the 
lawyers, service on the lawyers, knowledge of 
all concerned — nothing will suffice to start the 
90-day clock running except service on 
                                                                
4 We likewise reject the Government’s argument that Giles’s 
comment during the November 2006 bench trial that he had 
“heard” Campbell had died, Trial Tr. 32-33 vol. A, November 
29, 2006, meant that Giles had actual notice of Campbell’s 
death.  Rule 25(a)(3) requires service on nonparties pursuant 
to Rule 4, so Giles’s knowledge, or lack thereof, of 
Campbell’s death does not affect our analysis.  In addition, 
we note that the Government continued to represent Campbell 
throughout the bench trial and first appeal in this case without 
filing a suggestion of death on the record and then failed to 
serve its suggestion of death on the estate when it did file the 
suggestion on remand.   
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whoever is identified as the decedent’s 
representative or successor.   
 
The Atkins court went on to hold that a motion to substitute 
filed without serving the personal representative of the 
deceased plaintiff’s estate was “a nullity.”  Id.
 
   
Because neither the Government nor Giles served the 
estate pursuant to Rule 4, we will treat their filings as 
nullities, see Atkins, 547 F.3d at 874, and conclude that the 
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the estate.  
Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s denial of Giles’s 
motion to substitute and remand for Giles to have an 
opportunity to refile his motion to substitute and serve the 
estate.5
 
   
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
 
                                                                
5 We note that if the Government refiles its suggestion of 
death and serves the estate pursuant to Rule 4, it would 
trigger the ninety-day time limit set forth in Rule 25(a)(1).  
See Barlow, 39 F.3d at 233-34 (“[W]e hold that the 90 day 
period provided by Rule 25(a)(1) will not be triggered against 
Barlow’s estate until the appropriate representative of the 
estate is served a suggestion of death in the manner provided 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.”); Grandbouche, 913 
F.2d at 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that service of the 
suggestion of death on counsel for the deceased plaintiff was 
insufficient because Rule 25 required personal service on the 
estate, as a nonparty, and so the ninety-day limit in Rule 
25(a)(3) had not begun to run); Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 
985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding a suggestion of death filed 
by the attorney of the deceased client that did not name his 
widow, who was the executrix of his will, was not sufficient 
to trigger the ninety-day period for filing a motion to 
substitute under Rule 25(a)(1)).  
